The countercyclical capital buffer rate applicable to Hungarian exposures and the justification thereof

Based on the capital buffer guide, the other supplementary indicators relevant in terms of domestic financial systemic risks and credit market developments, the Financial Stability Board of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank has left the countercyclical capital buffer rate for exposures to counterparties in Hungary effective from 1 January 2024 unchanged at 0.5 per cent.

Countercyclical capital buffer rate for exposures to counterparties in Hungary	
From 1 January 2023 (percent)	0
From 1 July 2023 (percent)	0.5
Related information	30.06.2022
Countercyclical capital buffer rate based on the additional credit-to-GDP gap (per cent) – buffer guide	0
Countercyclical capital buffer rate based on the standardised credit-to-GDP gap (per cent)	0
Additional credit-to-GDP ratio (per cent)	43.2
Additional credit-to-GDP gap (percentage point)	-1.0
Standardised credit-to-GDP ratio (per cent)	99.9
Standardised credit-to-GDP gap (percentage point)	-1.2

Justification

Although the benchmark additional credit-to-GDP gap and the additional supplementary risk indicators examined do not require macroprudential intervention on a rule-basis, due to the historically high level of housing market overvaluation and to address the associated credit risks, the Financial Stability Board leaves the countercyclical capital buffer rate applicable to Hungarian exposures unchanged as of 1 January 2024, at the 0.5 per cent applicable from 1 July 2023.

To ensure banks' adequate shock absorbing capacity, maintaining the rate is justified by the historically high domestic housing market overvaluation, potential credit market risks arising from the financing of overvalued properties, the near-equilibrium stock of credit and the warning of the European Systemic Risk Board regarding increased Hungarian housing market risks.

Based on data from the second quarter of 2022, the additional credit-to-GDP gap, which serves as a guide for determining the countercyclical capital buffer rate, has slightly expanded in the negative direction again, i.e., it has moved away from the level that would justify macroprudential intervention on a rule-basis. Overall, the level of the supplementary indicators and their underlying fundamentals indicate a level and dynamics of overheating and vulnerability risks that do not justify cyclical macroprudential intervention. Despite the historically high level of housing market overvaluation, the deteriorating growth prospects due to war developments, the high inflation and interest rate environment, as well as the slowing lending dynamics already point to the easing of cyclical systemic risks. Therefore, a further increase of the countercyclical capital buffer is not justified.

For more details on the method of defining the countercyclical capital buffer guide and other monitored indicators, see the methodological notes and the indicators of the cyclical systemic risk map underlying the current decision.

Appendix

160 160 140 140 120 120 100 100 80 80 60 60 40 40 20 20 0 -20 -20 -40 06.2008 06.2009 06.2010 06.2012 06.2013 06.2016 06.2018 06.2019 06.2022 06.2011 06.2000 06.2015 06.2017 Additional credit-to-GDP gap -Additional credit-to-GDP --- Additional credit-to-GDP trend

Chart 1 – Development of the benchmark additional credit-to-GDP gap

Source: MNB. Note: benchmark additional credit-to-GDP gap based on country-specific methodology calculated on 30 June 2022 data.




Chart 2 - Development of the standardised credit-to-GDP gap

Source: MNB. Note: standardised credit-to-GDP gap based on the European Systemic Risk Board's recommendation calculated on 30 June 2022 data.